This viewpoint is part of Chapter 4 of Foresight Africa 2025-2030, a report with cutting-edge insights and actionable strategies for Africa’s inclusive and sustainable development in the run-up to 2030. Read the full chapter on effective governance.
Even when governments make progress in areas like infrastructure and economic opportunities, many citizens perceive a lack of tangible improvements in their daily lives.
The results of the 2024 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) are sobering. After several years of steady progress at the beginning of the 21st century—which saw hopeful strides in development, democracy, and the end of many long-standing conflicts—Africa’s overall public governance performance has stalled since 2018, grounding to a complete halt in 2022. For nearly half of the continent’s population, overall governance performance is worse in 2023 than it was in 2014.1
As highlighted in the report, a deepening security crisis and shrinking participatory environment across most of the continent are driving this trend and are offsetting any progress still being made in human and economic development. Of course, escalating conflicts and growing mistrust in democracy are sadly not unique to Africa. However, this trend is particularly concerning for Africa because it threatens both the progress already achieved and that which has yet to be built.
However, as a continent of 54 countries, Africa cannot be summarized by a single average. Indeed, the 2024 IIAG highlights notably divergent trends between countries.
On one hand, we watch concerning deteriorations in Sudan, in countries that underwent a coup in recent years, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in Tunisia, and even in Mauritius, which lost its first place ranking on the continent for the first time in IIAG history. Various lessons can be drawn here from each case, for both African countries and their partners.
The recent deterioration of governance in Mauritius makes it clear that resting on one’s laurels is not sufficient. Maintaining success requires an ongoing commitment, with no room for complacency. Tunisia has shown us that trade-offs between economic development and democracy are not sustainable. Although progress was still recorded in economic terms, the country has experienced the greatest decline in the participation indicator over the decade and the second largest decline in the accountability and transparency indicator.
The DRC’s widening gap between national wealth and its citizens’ poverty can only fuel increased instability. Africa’s wealthiest country when it comes to minerals, the DRC also ranks in the lowest end of the Human Development Index (HDI), having lost almost 20 points over the last decade in the security and safety category alone.
But partners also play a role.
The ongoing proxy war in Sudan led by non-African countries, and the international community’s hesitation in enabling the swift delivery of the dividends of a peaceful, civil transition, bear as much responsibility in Africa’s biggest crisis, as the Sudanese stakeholders.
The international community’s predilection for condemning a coup after the fact and calling for the “reestablishment of democratic institutions” comes too late for countries affected by coups. Often, it only fuels the mistrust of local populations toward these lesson-giving entities. To safeguard the international system, reactions should begin as soon as warning signs of overthrown democratic rules and practices by “democratically elected governments” are detected. There too, partners should strengthen efforts to help provide relevant economic and social prospects for the youth who often feel defeated by a poor economy and incentivized to join rebellions, enhancing the likelihood for violence. The inability of “democracy” to provide such opportunities was a key trigger for instability in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic, all of which sit on the lowest rungs of the latest (HDI).
On the other hand, many countries have made remarkable progress over the 2014-2023 decade. For thirteen countries—including Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, and Togo—governance performance is not only significantly better in 2023 than in 2014, but progress has accelerated over the decade. Gambia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Djibouti feature among the ten best-improved countries over the decade, gaining between 4 and 10 points, compared to the only marginal continental improvement of 1 point overall.
Every country that exhibited marked improvement over the decade was able to balance their progress across most governance dimensions without any damaging trade-off between development and democracy. Seychelles, which gained 10 points, landing in first place, managed to progress in all 16 Index sub-categories, the only country, along with Sierra Leone, to achieve this.
Many countries showed a notable improvement in the public administration dimension of the IIAG index, with the largest improvements registered by Somalia, Benin, and Morocco. Mostly, this is driven by impressive progress in the capacity of the statistical system indicator, which measures the extent of statistical data coverage and openness within a given country, the independence of national statistics offices, and a government’s cybersecurity capacity. Overall, the continent experienced a 7.9 point improvement on this metric. This is crucial to define relevant public policies and ensure their efficient implementation.
The tax and revenue mobilization indicator, however, remains a challenge. This component has lost almost two points at continental average over the decade under review. African governments can benefit from the expertise of various partners on this issue. Key to governance, it is the best way to ensure the delivery of public goods and services expected by citizens and the sovereignty and ownership of public policies.
But one of the most striking findings of the 2024 IIAG is the widening gap between governance improvements and the perceptions of Africa’s citizens. Even when governments make progress in areas like infrastructure and economic opportunities, many citizens perceive a lack of tangible improvements in their daily lives, or at least unmet expectations. And unmet expectations, especially among young people, fuel frustration and anger, which are strong drivers of unrest and conflict which undermine successful governance.
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Footnotes
- 2024 Ibrahim Index of African Governance: Index Report (London: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, October 2024), https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/sites/default/files/2024-10/2024-index-report.pdf.
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Commentary
Africa’s governance landscape: A tale of mixed progress and unmet expectations
May 15, 2025