

The Great American Migration Slowdown: Regional and Metropolitan Dimensions

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Findings

Analysis of U.S. domestic and international migration patterns through 2008-2009 reveals that:

- **In 2007-2008, the overall U.S. migration rate reached its lowest point since World War II.** The slowdown was especially pronounced for long-distance moves, which remained flat through 2008-2009, as well as for single people and renters. Both long-distance and short-distance movers were less likely to cite housing reasons for their moves.
- **From 2007 to 2008, 23 states, mostly in the Intermountain West and Southeast, showed reduced in-migration or a switch from in- to out-migration.** Thirteen states, mostly on the coasts, showed lower levels of out-migration. The migration fortunes of three Sun Belt states—Florida, Texas, and California—showed distinctly different loss and gain patterns in various population groups.
- **The metro areas that experienced the greatest recent migration declines were those that reaped the most migrants during the mid-decade housing bubble.** On the other hand, out-migration areas in northern states and along the coasts have bucked their long-term trend, retaining residents.
- **Migration to exurban and newer suburban counties dropped substantially, while it brought about unexpected “windfall” gains in many large urban cores.** Large urban areas such as Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia saw net out-migration shrink significantly from 2005 to 2008, and San Francisco actually posted a net migration gain after registering annual losses throughout the decade.
- **Although international migration to the U.S. has also declined, it continued to offset losses from domestic migration in many large metropolitan immigrant gateways throughout the decade.** In Chicago, Miami, and Washington, D.C., gains from immigration more than offset net domestic migration losses in 2007-2008, while Houston, Dallas, and San Francisco gained from both types of migration.

The recent migration slowdown was the surprising, but in retrospect inevitable, by-product of an unprecedented run-up in both housing values and housing-related debt. The credit crisis and Great Recession that followed left Americans flat-footed, as would-be movers were unable to find financing to buy a new home, buyers for their existing homes, or a new job in more desirable areas. When the housing market finally clears, and recovery is well underway, both Sun Belt and Snow Belt areas with diversified, new economy industries could find themselves at the leading edge of the next migration boom.

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Introduction

America has always been known as one of the most mobile countries in the world. Historically, Americans' pioneering spirit has led their migration westward; from the rural South to the industrial North; into the suburbs; to the Sun Belt; and most recently to interior frontiers in the Intermountain West and Southeast. Today, Americans' migration rates remain higher than those of most developed countries.¹

But recent events have challenged that narrative, as migration in America slowed considerably. The trend relates to a number of factors. First, in many parts of the country, including large parts of Florida, Nevada and Arizona, a housing "bubble" arose during the middle part of the decade due to overbuilding and easy mortgage credit. Second, the financial market crisis that began in September 2008 led to sharp reductions in credit. As a result, potential buyers had difficulty obtaining mortgages, and potential sellers saw reductions in the values of their homes. Third, the financial crisis greatly exacerbated the national recession that had begun in December 2007, reducing job availability in most regions of the country. This triple whammy of forces made it riskier for would-be homebuyers to find financing, would-be sellers to receive good value for their home, and potential long-distance movers to find employment in areas where jobs were previously plentiful.

As this report shows, while much attention has been given to the overall decline of migration in the United States, its impact was strongest on particular regions, states, metropolitan areas, cities, and suburbs. Shedding further light on the nature of the recent migration slowdown, the report details how different types of households and parts of the country have been affected and provides some insights on what may happen if and when migration again heats up.

After providing an overview of relevant data sources, the report proceeds in five parts. It first examines the overall magnitude of the migration downturn, and the social and demographic groups most affected by it. It places special emphasis on longer-distance, interstate migration, which took the greatest plunge in response to the troubled job and housing markets. Next, it considers how the migration slowdown has impacted individual states, focusing in particular on three traditional Sun Belt states—Florida, Texas, and California. An assessment of the slowdown's impacts on metropolitan areas follows, with attention to "mirror image" migration patterns between complementary metro areas in coastal California and the interior West; and between analogues in Florida and the Northeast. The report next looks at migration shifts within metropolitan areas between urban, suburban, and exurban areas. Finally, it discusses the continued role of international migration as a source of population gains for major immigrant magnet metropolitan areas. A conclusion summarizes findings and speculates about what they indicate for migration and population shifts within the United States over the next several years.

Methodology

Data and Measures

This report utilizes the most recently available government statistics on domestic and international migration to assess the state, regional, and metropolitan dimensions of the recent migration slowdown in the United States. Three of the data sources used are produced by the U.S. Census Bureau: (1) the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey; (2) the American Community Survey; and (3) the Population Estimates Program. A further source is the annual state-to-state migration flow data provided by the Internal Revenue Service. Each of these sources has different strengths with respect to history and recency, demographic detail, geographic specificity, and migration flow information. Each covers moves over one-year periods, with end points ranging from 2008 to early 2009.²

• **Current Population Survey (CPS).** The migration data for this report utilize the "residence one year ago" question from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the CPS, drawn from approximately 100,000 households representing the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States in March of each year. The CPS time series is the longest of all sources used here, beginning in March

1948 and ending in March 2009. It also provides migration information for a broad range of social and demographic attributes. Movers are defined as persons who have changed their residence over the past year, and rates are computed as moves per 100 residents aged 1 and above at the end of the year. The most recent data in this report derived from the CPS pertain to the period between March 2008 and March 2009.

- **American Community Survey (ACS).** The American Community Survey provides information on migration for a sample large enough to examine social and demographic attributes for migrants into and out of states and other large geographic areas. Beginning in 2005, it surveys 3 million households over a 12-month period and assesses migration based on a “residence 1 year ago” question. This report uses ACS data to compare the social and demographic attributes of net migration for 2004-2005 versus 2007-2008. Net migration for a state is defined as the number of migrants entering a state less the number of migrants leaving a state over the previous year. Unlike the CPS-ASEC, the ACS surveys households over a 12-month period rather than during a single month, so net migration statistics reflect the state average over the periods noted.

- **Population Estimates.** The Census Bureau’s Population Estimates program provides information on net domestic migration and net international migration for lower levels of geography (states, metropolitan areas, and counties) than are available with either the CPS or single-year ACS data. The estimates are not based directly on surveys but on models and administrative data. They provide population estimates for July 1 of each year, as well as the components of population change (domestic migration, international migration, births, and deaths) for one-year intervals of successive years (from July 1 to June 30) from 2000-2001 to 2007-2008. Annual migration rates are calculated per 100 residents at the beginning of the period.

- **IRS State-to-State Migration.** Annual state-to-state domestic migration flows are available from the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division, based on a comparison of tax filer addresses in consecutive years. Estimates of migration flows are based on the number of exemptions claimed by tax filers, which provide a proxy for persons in their families. The data include only those who filed taxes in successive years, and therefore omit some elderly individuals who do not file tax returns, and new filers who did not file in the previous year. This report uses state-to-state migration flows from 2000-2001 to 2007-2008 to estimate the “net migration contribution” to a given state from other areas of the country (regions and states).


Geography

This report presents migration statistics for states, the four Census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West), large metropolitan areas, and selected urban counties. (See Appendices C and D for 2000-2001 to 2007-2008 net migration statistics for all U.S. states and the 40 largest metropolitan areas). Metropolitan areas are defined according to Office of Management and Budget guidance issued in November 2008, though official names are abbreviated in tables and figures.

Findings

A. In 2007-2008, the overall U.S. migration rate reached its lowest point since World War II.

The past two years marked the least mobile period in postwar American society. In 2007-2008, only 11.9 percent of Americans changed residence, and this rose to just 12.5 percent in 2008-2009. Together, these are the lowest rates of annual mobility since migration statistics were collected in 1947-1948 (Figure 1). The rates are down from 13 to 14 percent earlier this decade, and even more so from the 16 to 17 percent rates that prevailed in the 1990s (See Appendix A). Back in the 1950s, almost one fifth of all Americans changed residence annually. Since that time, the American public has become somewhat more rooted due to higher rates of homeownership, and the aging of the baby boom generation.

Figure 1. Annual Domestic Migration Rate, United States, 1947-1948 to 2008-2009

Note: annual data not collected from 1971-1975 and 1976-1980. Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data

Declines in both long-distance and short-distance migration contributed to this historic U.S. migration slowdown. Long-distance migrants move among broader geographies such as metropolitan areas or states. For people of working age, these moves tend to be associated with changes in employment. In contrast, local or short-distance migration, sometimes called residential mobility, often accompanies a change in housing needs. This might include a move from renting to owning a home, to a different kind of house or neighborhood, or due to changes in family status like getting married or having children.³ Roughly three in five moves are short-distance moves; up to one in five is a long-distance move; and the remaining one in five is an inter-county, within-state move.

The rate at which people move within a county, a proxy for short-distance migration, reached 7.8 percent of the population in 2007-2008, the lowest rate since the end of World War II. It ticked up in 2008-2009 to 8.4 percent though it remains low by historical standards (Figure 2). In much of the 1990s greater than 10 percent of the population moved within county lines, as did well over 13 percent of Americans for much of the 1950s and 1960s. Residential mobility has declined gradually over time as homeownership rates have risen, and the population has aged, but the sharp downturn in the past two years relates very much to the housing market meltdown.


At the other end of the spectrum, the rate at which people move across state lines can serve as a proxy for long-distance migration. In both 2007-2008 and 2008-2009, annual interstate migration reached its lowest rates since the end of World War II (Figure 2). The recent decline in between-state migration is far more dramatic than that for within-county residential mobility. In fact, the 1.6 percent interstate migration rate for the past two years was half the value exhibited in 1999-2000, and far lower than the rate in the 1950s, when between 3 and 4 percent of the population moved across state lines annually.

As migration declined, housing became a notably less important driver for relocation, for short- and long-distance movers alike. In 2004-2005, amid the housing bubble period, 62 percent of within-county movers and 22 percent of interstate movers cited housing-related reasons as most important in explaining their move. By 2008-2009, those shares had declined to 57 and 14 percent, respectively. Job-related reasons explained fully 46 percent of the fewer interstate moves undertaken in the latter period (see Appendix B for details).

Although short-distance moves are more frequent, long-distance migration acts as an engine of growth in many metropolitan areas. It affects not only the sizes of their overall populations but also those of key social and demographic segments that impact the economic vitality of these areas.


The demographic attribute most related to migration is age; younger adults are far more likely to

Figure 2. Within-County and Interstate Migration Rates, United States, 1990-1991 to 2008-2009



Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data


Figure 3. Interstate Migration Rate by Age, United States, 2000-2001 and 2008-2009



Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data

move than older individuals. Figure 3 indicates that in 2000-2001, as in most years, individuals in their twenties showed the highest rate of interstate migration, a rate which tapered dramatically as individuals age into their late thirties and thereafter, with a small peak in the early sixties related to retirement moves. It was young adults—those with the highest rates of mobility—who showed the steepest declines in interstate migration by 2008-2009, with rates almost halving for 20 to 29 year-olds. Youth migration rates appear to have fallen in response to both a weakened job market and reduced home buying activity. Even the small bump in migration for seniors at retirement age disappeared in 2008-2009.

Other demographic and economic attributes are associated with migration as well (Figure 4). For instance, the most educated segments of the population are more likely to make long-distance moves, largely because college graduates and professionals operate in more of a national labor market,

Figure 4. Interstate Migration Rate by Demographic/Economic Attributes, United States, 2000-2001 to 2008-2009

Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data

attuned to opportunities in different regions of the country. Less-educated workers are more likely to change jobs within a labor market, and thus make shorter-distance moves.⁴ These differences have persisted during the migration slowdown, though all groups have been affected. Those with at least a college degree had higher rates of interstate mobility than other groups in 2008-2009. Yet each educational group experienced at least a one percentage point decline in its rates over the course of the decade.

Married couples and older widows and widowers generally exhibit lower levels of interstate migration than single and divorced persons, and this remained true in 2008-2009. Single individuals by virtue of their relative youth and lack of dependents may be the most “footloose” of marital status groups. However, those individuals experienced the most substantial decline in long-distance migration, perhaps deciding to live with parents or other friends and relatives as a result of the economic downturn, and not making as many long-distance labor-market-related moves.

Finally, economic attributes like employment status and homeownership also relate to migration, with the unemployed and renters typically undertaking long-distance moves more frequently. Both the employed and unemployed saw their interstate migration rates drop significantly over the course of the decade. Renters, meanwhile, showed a much more substantial fall-off in long-distance migration than their homeowner counterparts, perhaps reflecting not only their own worsened economic

prospects, but also the reluctance of owners to sell their homes and move during a period of nationwide home price declines.

Overall, the last few years brought a sharp decline in migration, particularly over long distances. A freeze in the housing market coupled with a fairly pervasive nationwide recession led to a sharp and historic decline in long-distance migration that has deeply affected more economically vulnerable members of society.⁵

B. From 2007 to 2008, 23 states, mostly in the Intermountain West and Southeast, showed reduced in-migration or a switch from in- to out-migration.

The recent downturn in interstate migration has had variable impacts on different parts of the country. States that grew fastest during the mid-decade “bubble” years have experienced the greatest downturns in recent in-migration. By the same token, several states that were considered unaffordable and exported migrants during those bubble years have seen out-migration decline considerably.

State-level migration patterns between 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 demonstrate the impacts of the downturn on different types of states (Map 1). The greatest shifts occurred in states that had benefitted most from the mid-decade housing boom, especially the southern and Intermountain West states of Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. Among the 28 states that gained migrants in 2006-2007, 19 gained fewer in 2007-2008, and an additional four (including Florida) flipped from gaining to losing domestic migrants. Among the 22 states and the District of Columbia that lost migrants in 2006-2007, 13—including California and New York—lost fewer migrants in 2007-2008.

Many of these high-cost coastal states lost migrants during the middle part of the decade to interior states where housing seemed more affordable. In 2004-2005, both California and New York lost about a quarter million migrants to other parts of the country. As more Americans stayed put in 2007-2008, California’s migration loss shrank to 144,000 and New York’s roughly halved to 126,000. A similar retention of potential out-migrants occurred in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut, as evidently many young couples, empty nesters, and retirees waited until new opportunities arose elsewhere.





Figure 5. Net Domestic Migration, Florida, Texas, and California, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008

Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data

During much of the post-World War II period, when Northerners contemplated moving to the Sun Belt, three states tended to stand out—Florida for Easterners; Texas for Midwesterners; and California for people from all parts of the country. Florida and Texas kept their luster in attracting migrants up through the first decade of this century (Appendix C). California began to lose its magnetism for domestic migrants during the 1990s, first due to a sharp economic downturn and later to high housing costs. The recent migration downturn has impacted each of these states somewhat differently.

Florida


Florida, of the three, is a poster child for the recent housing slump. Long a magnet for retirees, and more recently for broader segments of the population, Florida led the nation in domestic in-migration for the first half of this decade. Yet overbuilding and a high level of foreclosures made it one of the first states to show dramatic declines in migration, including a surprising switch from net in- to net out-migration between 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. This devastated the state's economy, which had relied heavily on the construction and real estate industries.⁶ Figure 5 shows that Florida's migration this decade peaked between 2003 and 2005 and began to taper in 2005-2006. A more significant plunge occurred between 2006 and 2008.

The major contributor to Florida's migration loss was its exchange with the Northeast (Figure 6). In-migration from that region, and from New York state and the New York metropolitan area especially, dominated that from other regions through 2005, then fell precipitously through 2008. Meanwhile, Florida began to export migrants on net to other parts of the South by 2005-2006, a pattern that accelerated the following year. Major migration gainers from Florida include Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. (See Appendix E for the top and bottom five state contributors to Florida's migration.)

Notably, Florida's statewide migration slowdown is not heavily concentrated in one part of the state. Between 2007 and 2008, fully 48 of Florida's 67 counties showed reduced in-migration or greater out-migration, signaling a truly statewide loss of magnetism.

The shift from net in-migration to net out-migration in Florida was especially strong for whites, Hispanics, younger people, married couples and persons with some college education (Appendix F). Despite its total net out-migration, Florida still attracted people aged 55 and over in 2007-2008. Of course, the considerable reduction in the in-migration of younger age groups stands to rob Florida of some of its traditionally vibrant, youthful, middle-class labor force.

Figure 6. Contribution to Net Domestic Migration by Region for Florida, Texas, and California, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008



Source: Brookings analysis of Internal Revenue Service state-to-state migration data

Note: Contribution to net domestic migration is defined as the size of in-migration flow from a region minus the size of the out-migration flow to that region.

Texas

Texas provides a sharp contrast to Florida. While also a traditional Sun Belt magnet, it is part of an economically different Sun Belt than Florida, one largely insulated from the mortgage crisis and steep home price declines and employment losses.⁷ Texas's more diverse economy and stricter home mortgage regulation (which itself resulted from excesses of the previous decade) have produced far fewer job losses and foreclosures than states like Florida, Arizona, and Nevada have experienced.⁸

As a result, Texas's migration patterns differ sharply from Florida's and California's (Figure 5). Buffeted to some degree by in-migration from post-Katrina New Orleans, the state has shown consistent net in-migration over the past few years, out-pacing its gains in the first part of the decade. Aside from the Katrina migration spike of 2005-2006, Texas's rise draws from all regions, especially California in the West (Figure 6). From 2003 to 2008, aside from Louisiana (where gains were strong post-Katrina but short-lived), California and Florida contributed the most migrants to Texas, while smaller but significant gains came from Illinois and New York.

A broad array of demographic groups, including whites, Hispanics, children, and younger married couples drove Texas's recent migration gains (Appendix F). Its reduced black in-migration can be attributed, in part, to Katrina-related return migration to Louisiana. Notably, Texas displayed heightened attraction for college graduates in 2007-2008 compared to 2004-2005, which could benefit the state economically over the long run.

California

The third traditional Sun Belt state, California, continues to show net domestic out-migration, which began in the 1990s (Figure 5). A significant portion of that population loss has been attributed to the high cost of living in coastal California, which tended to spread migrants to other nearby states (Nevada, Arizona, Oregon, and Washington), as well as to other parts of the Intermountain West and Texas.⁹

More recently, however, California exhibits something of the reverse pattern shown by Florida. While Florida attracted many more domestic in-migrants during the mid-decade housing bubble, California showed accelerated out-migration during those years. As the bubble began to burst, however, domestic out-migration from California slowed considerably. Migration away from areas stretching from San Francisco to San Diego, where high housing prices fueled "middle-class flight" to the interior West, has now retrenched as home foreclosures rise and job opportunities diminish in states like Nevada and Arizona.

Those Western states very much drive California's overall migration trend (Figure 6). The lion's share of domestic net out-migration was absorbed by other Western states during the first half of the decade, but between 2006 and 2008, the annual losses dropped by roughly half. Among these states, California lost the most migrants to Arizona and Nevada during the "bubble" year of 2004-2005. Now, however, Texas absorbs the greatest number of California out-migrants. In 2007-2008, California experienced net out-migration to 36 states and the District of Columbia, and received small net migration gains from Northeastern and Midwestern states including New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Michigan (Appendix E).

During the middle part of the decade, younger couples and singles with moderate education levels dominated the groups leaving California for lower-cost housing and job opportunities in surrounding states (Appendix F). Now, the state seems to be retaining many of these same groups, particularly younger whites and Hispanics who are married couples or singles, as housing cost pressures ease. Among educational groups, college graduates flipped from considerable net out-migration to modest net in-migration, as the housing market and job opportunities dried up in other parts of the country. For the moment, the national migration slowdown appears to have benefited California, as more of its younger, well-educated residents have remained Californians than in the recent past.

C. The metro areas that experienced the greatest recent migration declines were those that reaped the most migrants during the mid-decade housing bubble.

Looking within states to metropolitan areas provides a sharper contrast between the "winners" and "losers" in the recent migration slowdown. For example, the Riverside metropolitan area in southern California experienced a housing bubble similar to those in Las Vegas and Phoenix, and migration trends there have differed importantly from those occurring in coastal California metropolitan areas.

Several metropolitan areas that gained substantial numbers of in-migrants during the housing bubble years seem to have lost their attractive power more recently (Table 1). In both 2003-2004 and 2004-2005, Riverside, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Tampa, Orlando, and Atlanta led all metropolitan areas in net domestic migration. By 2005-2006, Tampa and Orlando had already dropped to eighth and tenth as Florida's housing bubble began to pop, while Riverside fell but remained in the top six. But by 2007-2008, Riverside had turned from a domestic migration gainer to one of the biggest losers (ranked 350 out of 363); Tampa and Orlando plummeted further down the list; and Las Vegas dropped to 13th.

As migration to destinations in Florida and the Intermountain West waned in the wake of the


Table 1. Metro Areas with Highest Annual Net Domestic Migration, 2003-2004 to 2007-2008

2003-2004		2004-2005		2005-2006		2006-2007		2007-2008	
1	Riverside 95,221	1	Phoenix 98,699	1	Phoenix 102,954	1	Atlanta 75,098	1	Phoenix 51,077
2	Phoenix 66,231	2	Riverside 72,502	2	Atlanta 95,661	2	Phoenix 65,949	2	Dallas 43,175
3	Las Vegas 53,848	3	Tampa 52,008	3	Houston 88,885	3	Dallas 52,260	3	Atlanta 43,051
4	Tampa 49,427	4	Orlando 51,939	4	Dallas 71,433	4	Charlotte 45,549	4	Houston 36,724
5	Orlando 44,365	5	Atlanta 51,462	5	Riverside 61,177	5	Austin 40,561	5	Austin 35,041
6	Atlanta 32,297	6	Las Vegas 39,186	6	Las Vegas 44,436	6	New Orleans 36,155	6	Charlotte 34,387
				8	Tampa 39,331	7	Las Vegas 32,876	13	Las Vegas 14,365
				10	Orlando 34,307	10	Riverside 29,715	25	Tampa 6,510
						15	Tampa 16,117	57	Orlando 3,153
						19	Orlando 11,570	350	Riverside -7,608

Note: Shading denotes metro areas ranking 1 to 6 in 2003-2004

Source: Author's analysis of American Community Survey data.

Figure 7. Net Domestic Migration, Selected Metro Areas by State/Region, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008



Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data

mortgage crisis, other metro areas climbed the list of top gainers. Chief among these were metro areas in Texas, including Dallas, Houston, and Austin. Yet recent migration gains among the top-ranked metro areas were not nearly as high as those in the middle of the decade. Phoenix continued to lead all other metro areas in domestic migration in 2007-2008, but its net annual inflow was only about half what it was just two years earlier. The same held for Atlanta, the second-largest gainer in 2007-2008.

A group of large Florida metro areas demonstrates the migration reversal evident at the statewide level (Figure 7). Orlando, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Cape Coral-Fort Myers each show migration peaks in 2004-2005, and noticeable declines in the last two years. Miami registered substantial net out-migration over this period, including a net loss of 84,000 domestic migrants in 2006-2007, though its outflow moderated the following year.

Large metro areas in Texas, including Dallas, Houston, and Austin, exhibit an entirely different pattern. They experienced far greater net in-migration in the latter years of this decade, at the same time that the migration bubble popped in Florida metro areas. Large gains in Houston, and to a lesser extent Dallas, in 2005-2006 reflect in part temporary gains from Louisianans displaced by the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Even as interstate migration plummeted nationwide, the three metro areas still managed to post net gains of 35,000 to 45,000 migrants each in 2007-2008.

Coastal California metro areas display something of a mirror-image migration pattern to their interior West counterparts. While the San Francisco Bay Area, San Diego, and especially Los Angeles saw increasing out-migration through the middle part of the decade, that trend moderated along with home prices over the past few years, such that San Francisco and San Diego each posted small migration gains in 2007-2008. Los Angeles lost only about half as many migrants that year as it did in 2005-2006. Its pattern roughly inverts that of the Phoenix metro area, the destination for

many Angelenos in the early to mid-2000s. Las Vegas and Riverside also received many of their migrants from coastal California during that earlier period, but have since seen inflows plummet.

As Map 1 demonstrates, the impacts of the migration slowdown were hardly limited to these Sun Belt destinations. Areas of the country that experienced significant migration outflows during the housing bubble years saw the trend turn less negative in the last couple of years (Figure 7). The Boston and Chicago metro areas shed increasing numbers of migrants through the middle part of the decade, but began to stanch the outflow in 2005-2006. The same held for the New York area; while net out-migration reduced its population by fully 144,000 in 2007-2008, that was only about half the migration loss it sustained just three years prior. Pittsburgh posted its smallest decline from net migration in more than a decade, while rising outflows from Buffalo, Cleveland, and Providence moderated after peaking in 2005-2006. The latter two metro areas have among the weakest regional economies in the United States today, however, and their migration fortunes may slip once again as long-distance household mobility begins to rise.¹⁰ Yet for the present, their migration patterns are “mirror images” of past years, when many of these residents were lost to fast-growing areas like those in Florida.

D. Migration to exurban and newer suburban counties dropped substantially, while it brought about unexpected “windfall” gains in many large urban cores.

Within metropolitan areas, suburban and exurban areas often benefited most from the mid-decade housing boom. There, new housing construction flourished as easy credit became available, especially in the Sun Belt where new jobs were plentiful. Yet the most recent migration data show that these same outer portions of metropolitan areas took the greatest hits as overall migration dried up.

Based on a system that classifies large metropolitan counties by the relative urbanization of their populations, throughout the entire 2000-2008 period, emerging suburban and exurban counties experienced greater domestic in-migration than typically closer-in, mature suburban counties (Figure 8).¹¹ Core and high-density counties actually lost domestic migrants on net each year.


But the disparity between the urban and suburban counties reached its peak in 2005-2006, and narrowed greatly in the following two years. Growth from in-migration declined significantly in both emerging suburban/exurban and closer-in mature suburban counties. Meanwhile, the rate of domestic out-migration from core and high-density counties more than halved, as these areas apparently retained more residents who might have previously decamped for fast-growing suburbs.

These broad patterns, aggregated from all large metropolitan areas, play out more distinctly in particular areas (Figure 9). Among large urban areas, the cities of New York and Boston, and Cook County, IL (which contains Chicago), all showed marked reductions in net out-migration after 2004-2005. Philadelphia’s net migration decline eased over the course of the decade. Outflow from Los Angeles County (which contains the city of Los Angeles) moderately significantly as well, though more recently. And San Francisco actually shifted from net out-migration throughout the decade to net in-migration in 2007-2008.

In contrast, fall-offs in domestic migration are evident in peripheral suburban counties within the metropolitan areas of Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Dallas, and Houston, among others. New York’s suburban counties counter this pattern as they tend to show either reduced migration losses or increased gains in 2007-2008. At the other extreme is Atlanta—an area that displayed metropolitan-wide migration declines in 2007-2008. There, 21 of 26 metropolitan counties showed reduced migration gains over the period.


Overall, these patterns reflect broader trends occurring within major metropolitan areas nationwide, wherein cities and core counties are either losing fewer or gaining more migrants than at mid-decade, when the hot housing market seemed to accelerate a rush to the suburbs and exurbs. Some of these shifts involved new migrants from outside the metro area landing in the exurbs and suburbs. However, the bulk of the movement to newer outer suburbs and exurbs represented local movers, from inner parts of the same metropolitan area, radiating outward.

Figure 8. Net Domestic Migration by Urban/Suburban County Type, 100 Largest Metro Areas, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008



Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data

Figure 9. Net Domestic Migration, Selected Urban Counties, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008



Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimate Program data

E. Although international migration to the U.S. has also declined, it continued to offset losses from domestic migration in many large metropolitan immigrant gateways throughout the decade.

The great migration downturn affected not just movement within the United States. Recent data suggest that the size of the U.S. foreign-born population may have stood almost still between 2007 and 2008, after increasing by about a half million the prior year, and by an average of 1 million per year between 1990 and 2006.¹² This leveling-off of the foreign-born population is attributable in part to a slowdown in immigrants arriving from Mexico.¹³

Despite this reduced flow, immigration remained an important contributor to population gains in large metropolitan gateways, which retain a high concentration of the nation's foreign born. From

Table 2. Annual Net International and Domestic Migration, Largest Immigrant Destination Metro Areas, 2000-2001 to 2007-2008

Metro Area									
Type of Migration	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	Total
<i>New York</i>									
International	166,837	157,472	138,747	125,810	132,549	135,277	122,908	123,058	1,102,658
Domestic	-176,418	-207,800	-236,767	-248,028	-284,253	-273,991	-219,104	-144,099	-1,790,460
<i>Los Angeles</i>									
International	124,689	117,720	103,045	93,827	98,800	98,254	89,508	89,674	815,517
Domestic	-104,034	-109,505	-119,876	-140,949	-200,728	-227,993	-221,144	-115,037	-1,239,266
<i>Miami</i>									
International	64,038	60,445	53,088	48,357	50,887	51,971	47,144	47,206	423,136
Domestic	-3,665	-1,766	-20,134	-3,199	-9,923	-50,595	-84,268	-46,997	-220,547
<i>Chicago</i>									
International	58,856	54,871	46,195	45,673	46,934	47,735	42,647	43,047	385,958
Domestic	-55,164	-68,856	-72,424	-65,555	-77,736	-69,542	-55,355	-42,110	-506,742
<i>Dallas</i>									
International	44,845	42,217	36,784	33,813	35,473	35,458	32,194	32,293	293,077
Domestic	48,552	13,919	-1,303	8,504	23,455	71,433	52,260	43,175	259,995
<i>Houston</i>									
International	40,772	38,474	33,667	30,705	32,283	32,227	29,330	29,392	266,850
Domestic	4,570	24,498	2,895	6,427	6,187	88,885	19,981	36,724	190,167
<i>San Francisco</i>									
International	38,223	35,981	31,542	28,792	30,288	30,138	27,434	27,504	249,902
Domestic	-24,917	-79,116	-74,174	-64,659	-51,236	-40,504	-20,536	5,506	-349,636
<i>Washington</i>									
International	38,132	33,480	24,643	32,068	29,807	31,879	27,244	27,975	245,228
Domestic	15,922	1,296	-8,500	-14,535	-16,790	-45,148	-35,337	-18,259	-121,351

Source: Brookings analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data

2000 to 2008, 25 percent of all net immigrant gains occurred in the two largest metropolitan magnets, New York and Los Angeles. Fully 49 percent of gains went to the top eight metro areas (Table 2). In most of these large destinations, international migration served to “cushion” losses from domestic migration, which persisted even during the late-decade slowdown.

Metropolitan New York and Los Angeles each withstood considerable domestic out-migration, especially during the “bubble years” when many of their residents were drawn to growing, more affordable destinations in the South and West. During all of these years, international migration gains served to counter domestic migration declines in these areas. And as net domestic out-migration fell rapidly from its mid-decade peak by 2007-2008, immigration—while down from its own peak early in the decade—held relatively steady.

Similar patterns defined Miami, Chicago, and Washington, D.C. during this period. In each metro area, domestic out-migration dropped approaching 2008, while international migration remained positive amid small but steady declines. Unlike New York and Los Angeles, however, all three metro areas posted international migration gains that exceeded domestic migration losses in 2007-2008, reversing trends from the previous year. In San Francisco, the early decade “dot-com bust” fueled domestic out-migration which moderated over the course of the 2000s, even as annual immigration to the region remained positive and relatively stable.

The two Texas metro areas, Dallas and Houston, rank fifth and sixth among U.S. metropolitan areas in attracting international migrants. Like the other large gateways, Dallas and Houston showed steadily

declining though positive levels of migration from abroad. Unlike other gateways, however, net domestic migration to these metro areas remained positive, and by 2007-2008, contributed more to these areas' population gains than international migration.

Overall, the immigration cushion has served to stabilize population in many of these large magnet areas in the midst of the decade's domestic migration ups and downs. This pattern extended to somewhat smaller gateways, too. Among the nation's largest 40 metropolitan areas, 20 sustained net domestic out-migration from 2000 to 2008, and in 15 of these metro areas, international migration ameliorated at least half of the associated population loss (See Appendix D). Modest declines in immigration to the nation's largest gateways are likely to be temporary, and previous inflow levels should resume when the national economy revives.

Conclusion

On a variety of dimensions, migration in the United States has come to something of a standstill. In the last two years, fewer Americans have moved long distances and locally than was the case for most of the post-World War II period. Some of this decline reflects the continuation of long-term trends, such as aging of the population and increased homeownership. Yet the recent sharp downturn in Americans' mobility can be attributed to the bursting housing bubble and the financial crisis that precipitated a global recession. These forces left Americans flat-footed, as would-be movers were unable to find financing to buy a new home, buyers for their existing homes, or employment in more desirable areas.

As this report demonstrates, the great migration slowdown generated distinct regional impacts. Several areas whose economies depended greatly on continued in-migration and growth—in the South and West regions and outer suburbs and exurbs nationwide—suddenly saw their economic engines and tax bases wither. Other areas that previously lost large numbers of migrants to these fast growing magnets—previously “unaffordable” coastal metropolitan areas, declining manufacturing areas, and urban cores everywhere—have seen a recent reduction in their out-migration, and potential economic gains from the migration slowdown.

How long will the current migration slowdown last? Some observers believe this is the beginning of a long-term trend, while others assert that the current migration downturn is simply a blip and that historical American mobility rates will soon resume.¹⁴

Meanwhile, commentators have voiced strong opinions about what “the other side” will look like if and when migration rates pick back up. Some view the bursting of the housing bubble and the areas it propped up—“cities in the sand” to use Richard Florida's phrase for superheated mid-decade growth areas—as the demise of a narrow form of development that depended primarily on real estate growth, fueled by the excesses of easy credit and relatively affordable housing. Such areas, Florida suggests, will have a hard time achieving their past migration attractiveness, unless more diverse economies emerge in these areas.¹⁵ Christopher Leinberger sees the recent suburban housing busts as the beginning of fundamental structural change in housing markets with the pendulum swinging back to urban core living, where at the extreme, suburbs will become uninhabited “slums.”¹⁶ Joel Kotkin sees the recent migration downturn as ushering in a “new localism” trend in America, a rootedness associated with an aging population, the Internet, and an increased focus on family life.¹⁷

If migration did continue to stagnate at the recent 2007-2009 levels, it would mark a sharp deviation from the long-term mobility and pioneering spirit that has characterized generations of Americans during most of this nation's history. The fact that, once again, new waves of immigrants and their children are populating large sections of our country and the younger segments of our age structure, suggests that the restlessness that has long linked aspirations of upward social mobility with geographic mobility is likely to continue. Domestic migration levels will probably not hit the high-water mark seen in the immediate post-World War II period, but there is reason to believe that when the housing market clears and recovery is well underway, more “normal” 1990s levels of migration will revive.

Which areas of the country will benefit from revived long-distance will depend greatly on the preferences of more globally aware, diverse, “Millennial” twenty-somethings, who will comprise an estimated 40 percent of adult migrants in the years immediately ahead. It is probably true that the

attractiveness of previous real estate-fueled growth magnets will not return to mid-decade levels anytime soon. Yet other metropolitan areas could be major draws. Already, there are signs of relatively strong economic performance in both Sun Belt and Snow Belt areas with diversified, new economy industries, or specializations in “eds and meds.” These include places like Seattle, Austin, Washington, D.C., Houston, Dallas, San Jose, Raleigh-Durham, as well as traditional young professional magnets like New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Within these broad areas, there will probably also be movement to outer suburbs and exurbs, though at reduced levels, and accompanied by a further “filling in” of their vibrant urban cores.

Moving ahead in America has long meant moving on, across both long distances (to new or better jobs) and short distances (to new or better homes). The betting here is that even the Great Recession, and the great migration slowdown that accompanied it, have not fundamentally altered this uniquely American idea. Migration rates will eventually rise again, but the winners and losers may look slightly different than during the last boom.

Appendix A. Annual Mobility Rates: Total, Within County, and Between States; United States, Selected Years, 1950-1951 to 2008-2009

Year	Annual Mobility Rates*		
	Total**	Within County	Between States
2008-09	12.5	8.4	1.6
2007-08	11.9	7.8	1.6
2006-07	13.2	8.6	1.7
2005-06	13.7	8.6	2.0
2004-05	13.9	7.9	2.6
2003-04	13.7	7.9	2.6
2002-03	14.2	8.3	2.7
2001-02	14.8	8.5	2.8
2000-01	14.2	8.0	2.8
1999-00	16.1	9.0	3.1
1998-99	15.9	9.4	2.8
1997-98	16.0	10.2	2.4
1996-97	16.5	10.5	2.4
1995-96	16.3	10.3	2.5
1994-95	16.4	10.8	2.2
1993-94	16.7	10.4	2.6
1992-93	17.0	10.7	2.7
1991-92	17.3	10.7	2.9
1990-91	17.0	10.3	2.9
1980-81	17.2	10.4	2.8
1970-71	18.7	11.4	3.4
1960-61	20.6	13.7	3.2
1950-51	21.2	13.9	3.5

* per 100 population

** includes movement within county, between counties but within state, between states, and from abroad

Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data

Appendix B. Reasons for Moving: Total, Within County, and Between State, 2004-2005 and 2008-2009

Reasons	Total Moves*		Within County		Between States	
	2004-2005	2008-2009	2004-2005	2008-2009	2004-2005	2008-2009
HOUSING RELATED	47.1	45.8	61.8	57.2	22.4	13.7
Wanted to own home, not rent	9.3	5.5	12.2	6.6	4.0	1.5
Wanted new or better housing	17.8	14.5	24.4	18.6	7.3	2.5
Wanted better neighborhood	4.0	5.0	4.8	6.2	2.0	1.6
For cheaper housing	6.6	11.1	8.7	13.9	3.5	3.9
Other housing reason	9.4	9.7	11.7	11.9	5.6	4.2
JOB RELATED	17.6	17.8	6.7	8.9	34.0	46.1
New job or job transfer	10.4	8.7	2.3	2.1	25.5	33.2
To look for work or lost job	1.9	2.7	0.5	1.0	3.0	7.3
For easier commute	3.4	5.0	3.3	5.0	1.6	1.9
Retired	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.2	1.4	1.2
Other job-related reason	1.4	1.0	0.4	0.6	2.5	2.5
FAMILY RELATED	27.1	26.4	26.3	26.6	30.4	25.4
Change in marital status	7.1	5.4	7.0	5.5	6.7	3.7
To establish own household	7.8	9.5	9.5	11.6	5.0	2.7
Other family reason	12.2	11.5	9.8	9.5	18.7	19.0
OTHERS	8.2	10.0	5.2	7.3	13.2	14.8
Attend/leave college	3.2	2.6	1.8	1.5	5.3	3.6
Change of climate	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.1	2.3	2.6
Health reasons	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	2.4	1.8
Other reasons	2.8	4.9	1.8	3.8	3.2	6.8
Natural disaster	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* includes movement within county, between counties but within state, between states, and from abroad

Source: Brookings analysis of Current Population Survey data

Appendix C. Net Domestic Migration and International Migration, U.S. States, 2000 to 2008

2000-2008 Total

State	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2000-2008 Total	
									Domestic Migration	International Migration
Alabama	-8,850	-8,616	4,821	5,123	16,248	32,945	18,496	15,118	75,285	29,910
Alaska	-2,891	1,916	2,619	629	-868	-1,981	-3,909	-3,732	-8,217	3,947
Arizona	56,868	69,983	63,038	90,745	132,123	137,697	87,245	62,980	700,679	208,005
Arkansas	-318	341	5,175	10,961	15,405	21,361	7,946	6,934	67,805	26,388
California	-38,896	-114,576	-96,329	-161,077	-250,028	-285,494	-268,809	-144,061	-1,359,270	1,754,946
Colorado	44,912	14,441	-7,517	-3,332	8,600	31,864	33,021	36,878	158,867	137,152
Connecticut	-7,175	-2,754	47	-14,320	-17,357	-15,125	-24,218	-14,985	-95,887	99,037
Delaware	2,835	4,193	5,814	6,090	7,813	5,792	4,615	4,126	41,278	13,669
D.C.	-4,277	-7,556	-10,261	-7,014	-6,766	-2,638	-3,323	-1,622	-43,457	25,027
Florida	157,832	185,226	170,864	266,157	266,850	174,416	37,650	-9,286	1,249,709	668,040
Georgia	55,256	43,308	36,629	51,800	62,318	120,420	98,666	56,674	525,071	233,520
Hawaii	-6,518	-724	5,019	-1,972	1,058	-3,461	-11,849	-3,752	-22,199	29,355
Idaho	7,422	6,847	9,068	13,170	20,215	22,049	19,975	12,767	111,513	17,142
Illinois	-69,865	-79,082	-78,604	-72,343	-85,236	-72,434	-56,984	-52,349	-566,897	409,865
Indiana	-6,499	-13,033	-2,231	-4,363	3,423	6,530	628	-1,979	-17,524	68,416
Iowa	-13,271	-13,252	-8,497	-3,840	-5,533	-598	-2,491	411	-47,071	35,444
Kansas	-13,837	-9,577	-9,750	-11,929	-10,937	-6,743	-3,280	284	-65,769	44,788
Kentucky	-1,329	4,543	10,926	5,941	13,606	10,464	17,044	11,828	73,023	29,943
Louisiana	-33,945	-18,993	-10,584	-9,846	-14,335	-271,330	27,500	13,555	-317,978	22,128
Maine	6,260	8,664	9,194	3,711	2,586	395	-963	-2,063	27,784	5,142
Maryland	8,893	12,872	7,579	-10,944	-12,488	-25,890	-33,716	-32,161	-85,855	131,327
Massachusetts	-15,550	-30,885	-43,558	-54,506	-55,443	-44,064	-32,607	-18,675	-295,288	204,945
Michigan	-25,441	-34,999	-32,954	-39,853	-57,267	-73,991	-95,787	-109,257	-469,549	151,589
Minnesota	7,441	-5,144	-9,347	-7,504	-12,513	-5,269	-5,028	-7,136	-44,500	86,871
Mississippi	-9,340	-7,206	-1,200	3,660	553	-16,819	3,833	-753	-27,272	10,116
Missouri	2,387	3,731	5,355	4,621	7,804	11,302	4,501	-2,384	37,317	50,449
Montana	-399	1,376	4,566	6,102	5,731	6,568	6,308	5,986	36,238	2,075
Nebraska	-8,364	-5,419	-2,685	-5,123	-3,515	-5,168	-5,367	-1,491	-37,132	26,464
Nevada	47,859	44,015	43,286	67,007	52,331	53,827	40,312	16,316	364,953	82,157
New Hampshire	10,507	8,365	5,499	5,454	2,722	1,790	-2,374	-2,473	29,490	13,702
New Jersey	-32,148	-31,049	-42,275	-51,221	-67,340	-77,639	-72,370	-56,208	-430,250	370,173
New Mexico	-9,406	4,542	4,383	4,966	6,981	7,703	8,082	1,032	28,283	32,959
New York	-165,928	-180,276	-188,515	-209,755	-248,647	-233,306	-185,638	-126,209	-1,538,274	844,299
North Carolina	46,295	43,785	47,499	44,338	73,418	110,632	116,245	98,074	580,286	182,816
North Dakota	-6,796	-4,061	-1,385	955	-3,390	-2,087	-2,251	-381	-19,396	3,083
Ohio	-37,792	-37,723	-33,067	-37,675	-45,033	-50,275	-47,350	-49,752	-338,667	92,711
Oklahoma	-10,013	1,072	-1,758	-3,966	-531	15,688	14,736	7,954	23,182	40,913
Oregon	13,654	23,342	11,582	2,444	22,821	33,735	25,297	24,756	157,631	88,851
Pennsylvania	-24,247	-6,556	1,211	-3,061	-3,334	3,312	-5,056	-11,462	-49,193	128,650

Appendix C. Net Domestic Migration and International Migration, U.S. States, 2000 to 2008 (continued)

State	Annual Domestic Migration								2000-2008 Total	
	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	Domestic Migration	International Migration
Rhode Island	2,181	3,053	1,563	-5,659	-10,937	-11,100	-12,013	-8,816	-41,728	23,946
South Carolina	14,333	19,287	26,053	29,254	30,133	48,538	54,115	49,736	271,449	39,552
South Dakota	-1,715	-1,387	361	1,712	160	1,988	2,146	2,194	5,459	4,400
Tennessee	11,645	11,546	20,658	24,066	42,720	50,821	47,193	31,198	239,847	59,377
Texas	40,485	45,853	30,039	32,414	53,582	219,742	138,088	140,862	701,065	818,866
Utah	-6,435	-4,321	-8,162	-2,438	9,373	18,428	23,846	17,605	47,896	61,465
Vermont	666	1,471	557	67	-556	-654	-1,767	-1,703	-1,919	4,914
Virginia	16,126	29,478	40,783	20,517	29,335	10,184	3,796	2,678	152,897	154,105
Washington	16,751	14,763	9,318	14,793	23,579	47,614	31,774	40,588	199,180	159,211
West Virginia	-7,062	1,998	4,423	2,294	2,283	2,614	2,449	3,788	12,787	4,209
Wisconsin	872	5,042	602	1,700	-2,042	-5,560	-4,995	-7,022	-11,403	57,253
Wyoming	-3,173	2,136	148	1,050	325	3,207	6,638	5,390	15,721	1,999

Source: Brookings analysis of Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data

Appendix D. Net Domestic Migration and International Migration, Large Metro Areas by Region, 2000 to 2008*

Region/ Metro Area**	Population (1000s)	Annual Domestic Migration										2000-2008 Total	
		2000- 2001	2001- 2002	2002- 2003	2003- 2004	2004- 2005	2005- 2006	2006- 2007	2007- 2008	Domestic	International		
NORTH													
New York	19,007	-176,418	-207,800	-236,767	-248,028	-284,253	-273,991	-219,104	-144,099	-1,790,460	1,102,658		
Philadelphia	5,838	-14,758	-7,821	-7,039	-8,118	-13,995	-16,119	-18,598	-21,848	-108,296	95,882		
Boston	4,523	-13,945	-35,445	-47,036	-46,821	-46,088	-32,988	-22,508	-8,261	-253,092	165,260		
Pittsburgh	2,351	-8,085	-5,404	-4,654	-8,698	-11,148	-9,860	-5,082	-2,432	-55,343	15,576		
Providence	1,597	3,047	5,679	3,428	-7,485	-13,530	-14,282	-13,766	-10,626	-47,535	29,689		
MIDWEST													
Chicago	9,570	-55,164	-68,856	-72,424	-65,555	-77,736	-69,542	-55,355	-42,110	-506,742	385,958		
Detroit	4,425	-25,209	-33,974	-30,532	-31,013	-38,727	-46,477	-59,081	-62,160	-327,173	91,394		
Minn-St.Paul	3,230	7,571	-4,601	-9,151	-4,184	-7,224	-2,764	-1,965	-3,440	-25,758	72,601		
St. Louis	2,817	-4,420	-4,495	-2,145	-4,724	-7,880	-3,670	-6,901	-5,567	-39,802	26,547		
Cincinnati	2,155	-1,560	-4,901	-3,657	-2,075	-1,837	-680	-1,354	-3,569	-19,633	17,287		
Cleveland	2,088	-14,943	-13,586	-13,684	-14,597	-17,697	-20,487	-16,829	-14,896	-126,719	25,432		
Kansas City	2,002	4,294	5,848	196	1,047	1,401	3,798	4,529	1,413	22,526	28,730		
Columbus	1,773	5,670	430	3,333	2,288	2,672	3,473	3,222	2,499	23,587	30,262		
Indianapolis	1,715	9,196	6,437	6,026	7,102	7,720	10,113	8,815	6,707	62,116	20,679		
Milwaukee	1,549	-8,619	-7,139	-7,866	-10,040	-12,903	-11,551	-7,844	-6,443	-72,405	23,709		
SOUTH													
Dallas	6,300	48,552	13,919	-1,303	8,504	23,455	71,433	52,260	43,175	259,995	293,077		
Houston	5,728	4,570	24,498	2,895	6,427	6,187	88,885	19,981	36,724	190,167	266,850		
Miami	5,415	-3,665	-1,766	-20,134	-3,199	-9,923	-50,595	-84,268	-46,997	-220,547	423,136		
Atlanta	5,376	47,792	26,219	22,507	32,297	51,462	95,661	75,098	43,051	394,087	181,920		
Washington, D.C.	5,358	15,922	1,296	-8,500	-14,535	-16,790	-45,148	-35,337	-18,259	-121,351	245,228		
Tampa	2,734	30,512	34,285	32,262	49,427	52,008	39,331	16,117	6,510	260,452	59,852		
Baltimore	2,667	-235	4,108	3,556	-6,434	-5,883	-6,573	-11,158	-12,352	-34,971	31,238		
Orlando	2,055	30,423	27,098	27,184	44,365	51,939	34,307	11,570	3,153	230,039	72,270		
San Antonio	2,031	5,651	16,252	16,578	15,025	15,605	31,421	30,910	22,791	154,233	28,977		
Charlotte	1,702	17,355	14,067	13,749	18,992	31,342	43,295	45,549	34,387	218,736	42,720		
Virginia Beach	1,658	-4,711	12,208	22,181	332	-4,659	-3,727	-14,556	-15,523	-8,455	-2,681		
Austin	1,653	34,655	4,780	6,916	14,624	22,537	38,918	40,561	35,041	198,032	59,259		
Nashville	1,551	8,171	4,164	7,332	13,458	16,605	22,834	20,638	16,625	109,827	25,388		
Jacksonville	1,313	14,164	17,992	17,543	19,733	17,781	18,753	11,405	4,768	122,139	11,101		

Appendix D. Net Domestic Migration and International Migration, Large Metro Areas by Region, 2000 to 2008* (continued)

Region/ Metro Area**	2008 Population (1000s)	Annual Domestic Migration										2000-2008 Total	
		2000- 2001	2001- 2002	2002- 2003	2003- 2004	2004- 2005	2005- 2006	2006- 2007	2007- 2008	Domestic	International		
										Migration	Migration		
WEST													
Los Angeles	12,873	-104,034	-109,505	-119,876	-140,949	-200,728	-227,993	-221,144	-115,037	-1,239,266	815,517		
Phoenix	4,282	49,818	49,846	44,673	66,231	98,699	102,954	65,949	51,077	529,247	168,765		
San Francisco	4,275	-24,917	-79,116	-74,174	-64,659	-51,236	-40,504	-20,536	5,506	-349,636	249,902		
Riverside	4,116	57,212	66,484	85,910	95,221	72,502	61,177	29,715	-7,608	460,613	96,382		
Seattle	3,345	4,962	-7,177	-12,931	-10,269	5,125	21,252	10,281	11,869	23,112	103,670		
San Diego	3,001	6,446	3,674	1,133	-38,101	-36,060	-35,785	-15,553	420	-113,826	98,650		
Denver	2,507	16,883	-5,212	-12,539	-7,127	-429	10,161	15,772	17,872	35,381	93,190		
Portland	2,207	17,123	14,485	4,025	485	12,335	18,366	17,101	17,996	101,916	68,655		
Sacramento	2,110	37,274	35,844	25,874	18,293	4,757	1,779	3,757	4,524	132,102	63,544		
Las Vegas	1,866	41,311	37,491	35,714	53,848	39,186	44,436	32,876	14,365	299,227	65,758		
San Jose	1,819	-36,884	-58,476	-44,179	-33,479	-22,154	-17,797	-11,903	-2,625	-227,497	162,882		

*40 largest Metro Areas based on 2008 Population Estimates

** Official name as defined by the Office of Management and Budget is abbreviated

Source: Brookings analysis of Census Bureau Population Estimates Program data

Appendix E. Top Five Origins and Destinations for Net Domestic Migration, Selected States, 2003-2004 to 2007-2008

States/ Origins or Destinations	Contributions to Net Domestic Migration*					Total
	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2003-2008
FLORIDA						
Origins						
New York	53,145	62,600	52,073	32,800	18,018	218,636
New Jersey	23,841	27,300	23,563	16,639	11,236	102,579
Massachusetts	15,902	16,838	13,117	8,072	3,931	57,860
Michigan	9,036	10,020	10,521	10,205	8,286	48,068
Pennsylvania	11,960	13,400	10,197	6,629	4,626	46,812
Destinations						
Georgia	1,098	-3,008	-15,828	-27,487	-19,995	-65,220
North Carolina	-269	-2,703	-11,398	-17,573	-15,804	-47,747
Tennessee	-340	-4,045	-9,679	-12,691	-10,479	-37,234
Texas	2,967	1,672	-6,232	-13,293	-15,142	-30,028
South Carolina	583	-524	-4,734	-7,081	-6,403	-18,159
TEXAS						
Origins						
California	11,990	23,270	41,164	50,647	32,406	159,477
Louisiana	3,576	5,617	79,791	-6,708	-192	82,084
Florida	-2,967	-1,672	6,232	13,293	15,142	30,028
Illinois	4,172	4,753	5,676	6,257	6,675	27,533
New York	3,015	3,782	5,179	5,799	5,218	22,993
Destinations						
Arkansas	-933	-1,559	-622	698	1,628	-788
District of Columbia	-164	-110	-168	-145	56	-531
Montana	-242	175	-78	-126	30	-241
CALIFORNIA						
Origins						
New York	2,641	3,842	3,779	3,467	3,303	17,032
New Jersey	2,193	2,762	3,041	2,557	2,988	13,541
Massachusetts	2,404	2,663	3,062	2,846	2,498	13,473
Michigan	1,418	1,237	2,226	2,931	4,218	12,030
Illinois	2,744	1,287	1,415	1,172	2,298	8,916
Destinations						
Arizona	-24,620	-45,265	-49,026	-31,408	-15,533	-165,852
Texas	-11,990	-23,270	-41,164	-50,647	-32,406	-159,477
Nevada	-30,374	-31,610	-30,925	-24,743	-12,094	-129,746
Oregon	-11,072	-18,159	-21,667	-16,549	-12,577	-80,024
Washington	-7,554	-14,211	-16,986	-13,099	-11,890	-63,740

**Appendix E. Top Five Origins and Destinations for Net Domestic Migration, Selected States,
2003-2004 to 2007-2008 (continued)**

States/ Origins or Destinations	Contributions to Net Domestic Migration*					Total
	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2003-2008
NEW YORK						
Origins						
Michigan	13	68	648	1,044	1,331	3,104
Massachusetts	693	71	12	-446	-152	178
North Dakota	2	53	34	-31	29	87
Destinations						
Florida	-53,145	-62,600	-52,073	-32,800	-18,018	-218,636
New Jersey	-26,488	-26,923	-24,144	-18,529	-15,737	-111,821
North Carolina	-10,273	-14,418	-16,968	-17,862	-15,970	-75,491
Pennsylvania	-15,115	-15,437	-15,613	-12,094	-7,759	-66,018
Georgia	-8,692	-10,648	-12,681	-12,742	-8,904	-53,667
ARIZONA						
Origins						
California	24,620	45,265	49,026	31,408	15,533	165,852
Illinois	5,138	5,430	5,261	3,616	3,224	22,669
Michigan	2,347	2,922	3,757	4,674	5,096	18,796
New York	3,067	3,532	3,992	3,221	2,121	15,933
Ohio	2,008	2,274	2,855	2,581	2,197	11,915
Destinations						
Texas	1,621	2,016	-565	-3,536	-3,524	-3,988
Idaho	129	-390	-631	-914	-739	-2,545
Arkansas	-145	-140	-360	-309	-323	-1,277
North Carolina	322	136	-523	-622	-562	-1,249
Tennessee	-48	-169	-325	-396	74	-864
NEVADA						
Origins						
California	30,374	31,610	30,925	24,743	12,094	129,746
New York	2,330	2,624	2,344	1,738	1,243	10,279
Illinois	2,261	2,010	2,059	1,277	1,051	8,658
Michigan	896	985	1,534	2,031	2,382	7,828
Hawaii	981	1,355	1,288	1,821	1,066	6,511
Destinations						
Arizona	-307	-2,224	-2,136	-965	-733	-6,365
Idaho	-194	-720	-1,207	-1,011	-902	-4,034
Texas	729	74	-767	-1,412	-1,754	-3,130
Utah	1,381	-413	-875	-1,323	-1,768	-2,998
Oregon	681	-254	-588	-633	-687	-1,481

*Contribution to net domestic migration is defined as: size of in-migration flow from the other state minus the size of the out-migration flow to that state

Source: Brookings analysis of Internal Revenue Service state-to-state migration data

Appendix F. Net Domestic Migration by Demographic Characteristics, Florida, Texas, and California, 2004-2005 and 2007-2008

	Florida		Texas		California	
	2004-2005	2007-2008	2004-2005	2007-2008	2004-2005	2007-2008
Race/Ethnicity						
White	112,217	-7,790	54,624	66,162	-160,452	-65,340
Black	13,593	9,462	49,252	17,252	-21,648	-13,063
Hispanic	45,178	-13,375	8,292	33,882	-91,423	-45,007
Asian	9,908	-1,715	4,649	10,103	-4,232	3,957
Age						
Under 15	24,488	-8,380	33,938	49,675	-88,709	-39,285
15-24	23,477	-8,727	12,775	10,104	-11,753	-2,770
25-34	22,428	-19,948	20,887	37,123	-44,598	-22,716
35-44	21,395	-2,227	13,367	19,456	-54,905	-20,927
45-54	27,298	264	11,965	4,970	-30,277	-12,783
55-64	41,784	14,306	7,003	2,111	-28,416	-10,891
65+	16,209	8,766	12,721	6,460	-22,315	-8,121
Educational Attainment						
Less than HS	15,584	3,649	8,698	12,365	-27,272	-16,335
HS Grad	37,741	4,760	18,269	11,678	-53,144	-20,699
Some College	35,745	-9,449	29,726	25,927	-59,052	-42,641
College Grad	40,044	2,201	9,250	20,150	-41,043	4,237
Marital Status						
Never married	49,982	-4,821	18,116	23,265	-22,631	-18,417
Currently married	94,780	-551	43,607	48,795	-131,581	-45,790
Divorced/Separated	13,923	3,498	17,434	8,990	-38,002	-16,689
Widowed	202	-4,947	3,288	2,769	-9,193	-2,626

Source: Brookings analysis of American Community Survey data

Endnotes

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2. More information on these sources can be found at: ASEC (www.census.gov/cps); ACS (www.census.gov/acs/www); Population Estimates Program (www.census.gov/popest/estimates.html); IRS migration data (www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=96943,00.html). See also: Emily Gross, "Internal Revenue Service Area-to-Area Migration Data: Strengths, Limitations and Current Trends" (Internal Revenue Service, 2005).
3. Reasons for moving across different distances and among different demographic groups are explored in Jason Schachter, "Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey" (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001); and D'Vera Cohn and Rich Morin, "American Mobility: Who Moves? Who Stays Put? Where's Home?" (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2008).
4. Among local residential movers, those with the least education are most likely to move. In 2007-2008, within-county migration rates for individuals with less than a high school education was 8.5 percent, compared with 6.3 percent for those who only graduated from high school and 4.5 percent for those who had schooling beyond college. This reflects the fact that less educated groups are more likely to be renters, who are much more prone to move than homeowners. Homeownership is less of a barrier for long-distance migrants.
5. Among racial groups, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics showed bigger declines in interstate migration than whites.
6. "Sorrow In the Sunshine." *The Economist*, July 11, 2009, page 33. Recent estimates produced by the University of Florida Bureau of Economic Business Research also show that the state sustained an overall population loss between April 2008 and April 2009. "Preliminary 2009 Florida Population Estimates" (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Bureau of Economic and Business Research, 2009).
7. Alan Berube and others, "MetroMonitor: Tracking Economic Recession and Recovery in America's 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas" (Brookings, September 2009).
8. "Lone Star Rising: A special report on Texas." *The Economist*. July 11, 2009.
9. Hans Johnson and Richard Lovelady, "Migration Between California and Other States: 1985-1994" (Sacramento: California Research Bureau of the California State Library and the Demographic Unit of the California Department of Finance, 1995); James P. Allen and Eugene Turner, "Migrants Between California and Other States." *The California Geographer* 47 (2007): 1-26; William H. Frey and Kao Lee Liaw, "Migration Within the United States: Role of Race-Ethnicity." *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs* (2005): 207-262; Dowell Meyers, John Pitkin, and Ricardo Ramirez, "The New Homegrown Majority in California: Recognizing the New Reality of Growing Commitment to the Golden State" (Los Angeles: USC School of Policy, Planning and Development, 2009).
10. Berube and others, "MetroMonitor."
11. The urban/suburban county type classification shown in Figure 8 pertains to counties within the nation's 100 largest metropolitan areas according to the following categories: Core and High-Density Urban (counties which contain major cities and/or have more than 95 percent of population in urbanized areas), Mature Suburban (counties with 75 to 94 percent of population in urbanized areas); and Emerging Suburban/Exurban (counties with less than 75 percent of population in urbanized areas).
12. The 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) recorded a U.S. foreign-born population of 37,960,935, lower than the 38,059,694 total for 2007. The 98,759-person decline is within sampling error, but it is the first recorded decline in the U.S. foreign-born population in the ACS since 2000, or the decennial census since 1970. Nonetheless, the size of the foreign-born population is affected by mortality and fertility of long-term foreign-born residents as well as recent international movement in both directions. Thus there continue to be new immigrant flows into the United States from more direct annual international migration estimates presented in this section.

13. Jeffrey Passel and D'Vera Cohn, "Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave?" (Washington: Pew Hispanic Center, 2009).
14. Todd Lewan, "Has Twilight Come to the Sun Belt?" *The Gainesville Sun*, May 30, 2009.
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Acknowledgments

The author thanks Cathy Sun of the University of Michigan Population Studies Center for assistance with Census data compilation and research. Additional thanks are due to John P. DeWitt, of Michigan for his research assistance efforts. Thanks are also due to Alan Berube and David Jackson at Brookings for their helpful comments on the manuscript, and to Jill Wilson at Brookings for production of the map.

The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program thanks the Rockefeller Foundation for its support of the program's research on the State of Metropolitan America, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the George Gund Foundation, and the Heinz Endowments for their general support of the program.

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